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The Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination, once an
impregnable bastion freely conceded to an individual taxpayer and his
business records, has long played a dominant role in protecting the
embattled taxpayer during a fraud investigation. By a narrow and
literal construction, however, four recent Supreme Court decisions
have drained much of the former vitality from this constitutional bul-
wark. The full impact of these decisions can be understood only by an
analysis of their underlying rationale and consideration of the questions
left unanswered by the Court.
THE POSSESSION REQUIREMENT
Couch v. United States' signalled the narrow construction of the
privilege that was to be applied in subsequent decisions. In Couch, the
Court held that an individual taxpayer could not prevent the produc-
tion of business records of a proprietorship found in the accountant's
possession when the IRS summons was served. The taxpayer contended
that her personal ownership of the records, which she customarily left
with the accountant, was sufficient to provide protection by reason of
her privilege against self-incrimination. The Court replied, however,
that possession, rather than ownership, "bears the closest relationship
to the personal compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment." 2 The
opinion emphasized that compulsion against the person of the accused
is one of the privilege's essential prerequisites. Noting that the sum-
mons and the enforcement order were directed to the accountant, the
Court concluded that he, not the taxpayer, was the only one compelled
to do anything.
Although Couch held that possession is essential, the Court con-
ceded that the privilege might still be invoked in situations where the
individual clearly retains "constructive possession", or where his re-
linquishment of possession is merely "temporary and insignificant".3
The opinion did not explain these rather abstruse exceptions, but cited
cases holding that personal records stored in corporate offices remain
in the constructive possession of the individual and may not be reached
by subpoenas directed to the corporation.' Although Couch raises seri-
* Some of the views expressed herein parallel the position taken by the author
in litigation pending in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
1 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
2Id. at 331.
I d. at 333.
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F. 2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v.
Guterma, 272 F. 2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959).
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ous problems concerning the closeness with which possession of per-
sonal records must be guarded, the question may have been resolved
by a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court.
In Fisher v. United States," the Court advanced the unique theory
that the act of producing records, rather than the contents of the records
themselves, is the only testimonial communication which the privilege
protects. Fisher holds in essence that only the person performing the
physical act of production may claim the privilege. The prudent tax-
payer, therefore, will maintain sufficient possession and control of
records so that he is the only individual to whom a summons could be
directed. However, the taxpayer may safely relinquish possession of
the records to his attorney, provided this is done in the course of seek-
ing legal advice. In such an instance, Fisher holds that the attorney-
client privilege prohibits compulsory production from the attorney if
the records would have been protected in the hands of the taxpayer.,
LOST PRIVILEGE FOR PARTNERSHIP RECORDS
For many years, it had been well-established that the privilege against
self-incrimination does not apply to corporations, labor unions, and
similar artificial organizations that do not represent the purely private
or personal interests of their members.- It was equally clear that the
custodian of records belonging to such organizations is not privileged
from producing the records even though he personally might be in-
criminated by their contents. In Bellis v. United States,' however, the
protection afforded by the privilcge was seriously eroded by the holding
that the records of the traditional partnership are not protected.
In Bellis, the Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination
does not apply to the records of any organization which represents
"organized, institutional activity".' Such a finding is appropriate, the
" Id. at 98.
Court indicated, in all instances where the organization is recognized
as an independent entity from its individual members. However, it must
be a relatively well-organized and structured group, not merely a loose,
informal association of individuals. Moreover, the organization must
maintain a distinct set of records and recognize rights in its members
of control and access thereto.
:425 U.S. 391 (1976).
"Id. at 404-405. Wigmore treats the attorney simply as the agent of the owner
and states that the amenability of pre-existing documents depends "upon the
other privileges of the client" 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2307, p. 591 (McNaughton
rev. 1961).
- For a review of the cases, see Lipton and Petrie. Constitutional Safeguard.%
and Corporate Records, 23rd Annual N.Y.U. Institute on Federal Taxation 1315
(1965): also, Lipton, Constitutional Protection for Books and Record.s in Tax
Fraud Investigations, 29th Annual N.Y.U. Instituie on Federal Taxation 945
(1971).
1 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
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The Court examined the three-man law firm in Bellis and con-
cluded that the partnership had an institutional identity independent
of its individuals. The opinion noted that the partnership was not an
informal association or a temporary arrangement for the undertaking
of a few, short-lived projects. The law firm, the Court observed, had
been in business for nearly fifteen years, had six employees, filed sepa-
rate tax returns, had its own records and bank account, and was re-
garded by state law as a distinct entity for numerous purposes.
The Court also noted that Bellis was holding the partnership records
in a representative capacity. Rejecting the argument that Bellis had a
substantial and direct ownership interest in the records, the Court de-
clared that they were partnership property and that his interest in such
property was a "derivative interest" subject to significant limitations.
The opinion emphasized that the other partners at all times had a
right of access to the records under state law and were entitled to in-
spect and copy them.
The small size of the Bellis partnership, as well as the Court's state-
ment that size of the organization is not itself determinative of the
privilege issue, would seem to foreclose future arguments based solely
on that factor. The Court did suggest, however, that there might be
other exceptions to its general holding. The opinion concluded with the
statement that this might have been a "different case if it involved a
small family partnership" or if there "were some other preexisting
relationship of confidentiality among the partners."' 0
The "Small Family" Exception
One district court case cited in Bellis as an example of the small
fh.r 1y partnership exception was United States v. Slutsky,", which held
that large economic size alone may not preclude the partners from
claiming the privilege. In Slutsky, two brothers operated a country
resort that had been in business more than 70 years. It had a sales office
in New York, 325 guest rooms, facilities on a 1,000 acre tract, build-
ings worth about $4,400,000, a payroll of about $1,000,000, and both
a full-time bookkeeper and accountant. The court held that the Slutsky
records were privileged. The court declared that the partnership's eco-
nomic "size ...is not determinative," but rather that the focus must
be "placed on the extent and nature of the ownership group." The
opinion concluded that a "two man partnership consisting of two
brothers is .. .as small as possible." 12
The Third Circuit, however, refused to apply the small family ex-
ception to a four-brother law firm, stating enigmatically that "whatever
the full import of the quoted statement [from Bellis] may be, we do not
'id. at 101.
1 352 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
121 d. at 1108.
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think it applicable in the present context." 'I The Tax Court also re-
jected the exception in the case of a father and son-in-law partnership, 4
and a district court recently denied protection to the records of a part-
nership consisting of a man and his spouse.' 5 The Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, apparently would apply the Bellis exception under appropriate
circumstances. In United States v. Greenleaf,16 the Court held that a
partnership consisting of unrelated members "did not qualify as the
type of small family partnership protected in" the Slutsky case.
The "Confidential Relationship" Exception
The second exception mentioned in Bellis, a preexisting relationship
of confidentiality among the partners, is of little significance. Taking
the statement at face value, a partnership agreement seemingly could
be framed in such a manner as to safeguard the privilege by requiring
confidentiality. In Greenleaf, however, the Fifth Circuit stated that a
partnership agreement cannot create the type of confidentiality referred
to in Bellis. That confidentiality, the appellate court said, is one that
traditionally creates a testimonial privilege, such as the attorney-client
privilege.
Acquisition of Exclusive Ownership
Another question left unanswered by Bellis relates to the status of
the records of a dissolved and fully terminated partnership where sole
ownership of the assets, including the partnership records, has been
acquired by one of the former partners. Bellis held that privilege may
not be claimed with respect to organizational records which are being
held in a "representative capacity." '1 In concluding that Bellis was
not holding records in his personal capacity, the Supreme Court empha-
sized that the records were partnership property in which he had no
direct ownership interest and which were subject to the rights of his
former partners to inspect and to have a formal accounting. However,
when one partner acquires exclusive ownership of the records of a
terminated partnership by purchasing the assets or remaining interests,
it is well-settled that the other partners give up all their former rights
to inspect the records or to have a formal accounting.' 8 Thereafter,
the records are no longer being held in a representative capacity.
The mere dissolution of a partnership, however, without termination
1- United States v. Mahady & Mahady, 512 F. 2d 521, 524 (3d Cir. 1975).
14 Harry Gordon, 63 T.C. 51, 69-71 (1974).
11 Matter of September, 1975 Special Grand Jury, 435 F Supp. 538 (N.D.
Ind. 1977).
16 546 F. 2d 123, 128 (5th Cir. 1977).
IT 417 U.S. at 97-98, 101.
'Sanderson v. Cooke, 175 N.E. 518, 521 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1931); Kelly v.
Kelly, 411 S.W. 2d 953, 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); 60 Am. Jur. 2d Partnership
§§ 265, 267, 296 (1972).
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and lawful acquisition of the records by one partner, does not bestow
upon a partner a greater claim to privilege than existed during the
firm's active life. Bellis, in fact, involved a dissolved partnership that
was in the process of winding up its affairs. As the Court recognized,
the other partners still retained the right to inspect the records and to
an accounting, and Bellis continued to hold the records in a repre-
sentative capacity.
In a footnote to Bellis,"' the Court noted that the dissolution of a
corporation does not give the custodian any greater claim to the Fifth
Amendment privilege and suggested that the same should be true of
records of a dissolved partnership. The two early Supreme Court cases
cited in support of this comment involved corporate records, title to
which had been conveyed to former officers after dissolution.2° If there
were no distinctions between the two types of entities, the cited authori-
ties apparently would preclude a claim of privilege as to partnership
records even though exclusive ownership had been acquired by one of
the former partners. 21
There are, however, significant differences between corporations and
partnerships. A corporation is a creature of the state and is presumed
to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. The state retains a
visitorial power to examine the affairs of the corporation. This power
"of necessity reaches the corporate books, without regard to the con-
duct of the custodian."-' Hence, corporate records always remain sub-
ject to inspection and examination by the state under its retained
visitorial power. The owner-custodian continues to hold such records
in a representative capacity even after dissolution.
A partnership, however, is merely a contract, or the relationship aris-
ing out of a contract, between two or more persons. 23 Since a partner-
ship is not created by the state, the right of access to, and inspection of,
its records is conferred only upon the partners. When exclusive title to
partnership records is acquired by one of the partners, such rights of
the other partners terminate. Because the records no longer are being
held in a representative capacity, they should be protected by the
owner's privilege against self-incrimination.
A NEW PRIVILEGE THEORY--THE ACT OF PRODUCTION
OF RECORDS
One redeeming feature of the Bellis decision was its reaffirmation
that the Fifth Amendment privilege "applies to the business records
19417 U.S. at 96, n.3.
20 Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913); Grant v. United States, 227
U.S. 74 (1913).
21 One district court has so held. See United States v. Hankins, 424 F. Supp.
(06, 615 (N.D. Miss. 1976), on appeal 5th Cir.
22 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911).
28 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 1 (1950).
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of the sole proprietor . . as well as to personal documents containing
more intimate information".2 However, the broad implications of this
encouraging statement have been undermined by subsequent Supreme
Court decisions discussed below.
In Fisher v. United States,"' the Supreme Court adopted a new
rationale delineating the circumstances under which the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege precludes the compulsory production of records or
other documents. In substance, the Court held that the only com-
pelled, testimonial communication involved in producing records or
papers, in response to an official demand, is the act of production
itself. Under this unique approach, the contents of the documents
themselves may be of no consequence, regardless of how intimate or
private they may be. Even though the writing or contents may be
incriminating and testimonial, the Court explained that such writing is
"wholly voluntary" and does not constitute "compelled testimonial
evidence".11 Unless the Government compels the subpoenaed person
to write the document, the Court noted, the fact that it was written
by him affords the paper no greater protection under the Fifth Amend-
ment.
Wholly apart from the contents of the papers, however, Justice
White noted that the act of producing them in response to a subpoena
involves two basic communicative aspects of its own. First, compliance
with the subpoena "tacitly concedes the existence of the papers de-
manded and their possession or control by the taxpayer". Second, such
compliance also would "indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers
are those described in the subpoena." The latter communicative act
was variously described by the Court as "implicit authentication" of the
records or an admission of their genuineness.27
The opinion conceded that the essential element of compulsion is
clearly present when records are subpoenaed. However, the opinion
states that the more difficult issues are whether the tacit averments or
implicit admissions incidental to compliance are both "testimonial" and
"incriminating" for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment. Ad-
mitting that these questions do not lend themselves to categorical
answers, the Court cautioned that their resolution may depend on the
"facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof." 28
In Fisher, the taxpayer had obtained possession of his accountant's
workpapers and had turned them over to his attorney shortly after he
had been interviewed by a revenue agent. Subsequently, an IRS sum-
mons for the papers was served on the attorney. At the outset, the
Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment rights of the taxpayer
24 417 U.S. at 87-88.
25 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
2, ld. at 409-410.
27 Id. at 410.
2 Id. at 410.
TAX CONFERENCE
were not implicated inasmuch as the subpoena was not directed to
him. However, the opinion concluded that the papers turned over to
the attorney would be protected by the attorney-client privilege if such
papers would have been privileged in the hands of the taxpayer by
reason of the Fifth Amendment. The Court then proceeded to de-
termine the status of the accountant's papers as though they had in
fact been in the possession of the taxpayer.
Implicit Authentication
Examining the possibility that the taxpayer's act of production might
constitute implicit authentication of the accountant's workpapers, Fisher
emphasized that the taxpayer did not prepare the papers and was not
competent to authenticate them. The Court concluded that production
would express nothing more than the taxpayer's belief that the papers
are those described in the subpoena and would not represent a sub-
stantial threat of self-incrimination. The opinion, moreover, compared
the taxpayer's position as mere possessor of his accountant's workpapers
to the custodian of corporate, union or partnership books. In those
cases, the Court noted, the custodian must respond to a subpoena even
though he kept the books and his production would itself be sufficient
authentication to permit their introduction against him. 29
Tacit Admission of Existence and Possession
The Fisher opinion also held that the admission of existence and
possession of the accountant's papers, implicit in their production by
the taxpayer, would not rise to the level of testimony protected by the
Fifth Amendment. Stressing the fact that the papers "belong to the
accountant", the Court declared that the Government was in no way
relying on the "truth telling" of the taxpayer to prove the existence of,
or his access to, the documents. The opinion makes the very significant
observation, however, that the existence and location of the papers
was "a foregone conclusion".80 Thus, tacit concession that the taxpayer
had the papers added little or nothing to the Government's information,
the Court reasoned.
In considering this question, the Court emphasized that the taxpayer
was a mere possessor of the workpapers and did not own them. The
opinion equates the taxpayer's bare possession of the papers with that
of a custodian in the possession of corporate, union or partnership
records. In none of these situations, the Court concluded, is there any
question regarding the existence and possession or control of the sub-
poenaed records, and the custodian or mere possessor must produce
29 Id. at 413, n. 14.
30 Id. at 411.
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the incriminating documents despite the fact that such production
admits their existence and location in the hands of the possessor.31
The Significance of Ownership
Although the rationale adopted in Fisher may raise more questions
than it answered, it is reasonably clear that the taxpayer's bare posses-
sion of records owned by someone else will not provide a successful
basis for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege. Similarly, there is
some doubt that privilege will be extended to records previously pre-
pared and owned by a third party, even though the taxpayer acquired
exclusive title and possession prior to any demand for their production
by the IRS.
Regarding the protection that might be available to the taxpayer
with respect to the records maintained by him as a sole proprietor, the
Court commented in Fisher that this was "a question not involved
here". :'2 Despite this gratuitous concluding remark, it is reasonably
clear that the Fisher rationale would serve to protect the sole proprietor
against compulsory production of his records in response to a subpoena
dues tecum or IRS summons.33
The taxpayer's act of producing his own business records is a clear
admission that they are genuine and that they are the records described
in the summons. Unlike Fisher, the records belong to the taxpayer, and
he unquestionably is competent to authenticate them. This conclusion
is not altered by the fact that someone else, such as an accountant or
bookkeeper, also would be competent to attest to the genuineness of
the tax records. So long as the testimony elicited from the taxpayer is
incriminating, a clair- of privilege is not negated by the availability of
a third party with similar knowledge of the facts. The denial of privilege
in Fisher was based on the inability of the taxpayer to authenticate the
accountant's workpapers, not the fact that the accountant also was
available to offer such testimony.
The taxpayer's act of producing his own records also would consti-
tute an incriminating admission of their existence and possession. As in
the case of authentication, moreover, this conclusion is not affected by
the availability of third-party testimony regarding existence of the rec-
ords and the taxpayer's possession and control. Recently, a district
court refused to compel the production of telephone tape recordings
owned by a witness despite the testimony of another individual as to
the existence, authenticity, and the witnesses' possession of the tapes.34
31 Id. at 411-412.
Id. at 414.
33 See United States v, Plesons, 560 F. 2d 890 (8th Cir. 1977), holding that
the records of a physician are protected by the Fifth Amendment, but that the
doctor waived his rights by failing to invoke his privilege in response to a Grand
Jury subpoena.
34 In re Bernstein, 425 F Supp. 37 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
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The Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege was properly in-
voked where there exists "this tripartite unity over ownership, possession
and self-incrimination." 1-5
The entire thrust of the opinion in Fisher is directed at the com-
pulsory production of records in the mere possession of a custodian
who is not the owner. Implicit in all custodian and simple possessor
cases is the valid legal presumption or, as the Court said, the "foregone
conclusion" that the records are in existence and in the possession of
the holder. This is consistent with the limited rights of the custodian.
He is not the owner and has no recognized legal rights to dispose of,
or to destroy, records belonging to others. No such presumption or
conclusion, however, attaches to the sole owner of records. He may
or may not maintain a variety of records, and he may retain or dispose
of them at any time and in any manner he deems appropriate. Accord-
ingly, there can be no "foregone conclusion" with respect to the exist-
ence, possession or custody of personally owned records. Therefore,
under the rationale of Fisher, the compelled production of records from
the hands of the individual owner constitutes a testimonial communica-
tion that should be protected by his Fifth Amendment privilege.
The foregoing analysis would seem to apply with equal force where
the taxpayer acquires ewnership of records that originally were pre-
pared or owned by someone else. Thus, compulsory production of
former partnership records or an accountant's workpapers, sole title to
which has passed to the taxpayer, may be protected by the privilege.
In such instances, the tacit admission of existence and possession may
rise to the level of incriminating testimony. Whether implicit authenti-
cation of the records also is involved would depend on whether the
taxpayer is competent to vouch for the accuracy and genuineness of the
records. Production of an accountant's workpapers, even if owned by
the taxpayer, probably would not involve such incriminating authen-
tication.
The promise of the Fisher theory, as Justice Marshall indicated in
his separate opinion, lies in its "innovative discernment that production
may also verify the documents' very existence and present possess-on
by the producer." " This testimonial aspect of producing records offers
the brightest prospect for protection of records owned by the sub-
poenaed party. Nevertheless, a recent Ninth Circuit opinion, relying on
Fisher, suggests that even the taxpayer's ownership of an accountant's
workpapers would not preclude compulsory production.37 The Court,
however, did not consider or discuss the incriminating admission of
existence or possession that is implicit in the act of production. The
opinion merely holds that the act of compliance would not compel the
• 5 Id. at 39.
36 425 U.S. at 432.
.37 Matter of Fred R. Witte Center Glass No. 3, 544 F. 2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1976).
TAX CONFERENCE
taxpayer to authenticate or affirm the truth of the contents of the
records.
SEIZURE PURSUANT TO A SEARCH WARRANT
Section 7608(b) of the Code authorizes a special agent to execute
and serve search warrants. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure prescribes the requirements and procedures for the issuance
of such a warrant. Paragraph (b) (1) of the Rule, adopted in 1968,
provides that a warrant may be issued to search for and seize any
property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal
offense. The new rule was prompted by the Supreme Court's decision
in Warden v. Haydena approving the seizure of "mere evidence".
Previously, only contraband and the fruits or instrumentalities of crime
were subject to search and seizure.
Prior to the 1968 enactment, search warrants were rarely used in
income tax investigations. Their subsequent use engendered litigation,
a conflict among the circuits, and some articles highly critical of the
utilization of such drastic process to seize a taxpayer's books and
records. 9 In Andresen v. Maryland,'° however, the search warrant was
approved as an appropriate instrument for the forcible seizure of papers,
records and documents which would not be amenable to compulsory
production by a subpoena duces tecum. At the same time, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in tax cases pending in the appellate courts. 1
In the light of the Fisher rationale, the Supreme Court's subsequent
approval of the search warrant as a permissable means of forcibly seiz-
ing private records was clearly predictable. In Andresen, the Court held
that a search authorized by warrant involves neither compulsion upon
the individual nor any self-incriminating, testimonial act. The opinion
noted that the statements contained in the documents had been volun-
tarily committed to writing and that the individual was not required
to perform any act which aided in the discovery, production, or au-
thentication of the incriminating evidence.
Fortunately, the opinion in Andresen states that the Fifth Amend-
ment may protect an individual from complying with a subpoena for
the production of personal records in his possession, noting that the
very act of production may constitute a compulsory authentication of
incriminating information.42 Resort to the search warrant presumably
will be strictly limited, and the necessity of establishing "probable
38387 U.S. 294 (1967).
39 See, e.g., Lipton, How Valid is IRS Use of Search Warrants to Find and
Seize Evidence of Fraud in Tax Cases, 41 J. of Tax. 95 (Aug. 1974); Lyon,
Tax Investigation Revisited, 29 Tax Lawyer 477 (Spring, 1976).
40 427 U.S. 462 (1976).
41Truitt v. Lenahan, 529 F. 2d 230 (6th Cir. 1976); Shaffer v. Wilson, 523
F. 2d 175 (10th Cir. 1975).
42 427 U.S. at 473-474.
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cause" that a crime has been committed normally provides a formidable
safeguard against the use of search warrants. Nevertheless, the result
in Andresen has seriously diminished the protection available under
the Fifth Amendment for the records of the sole proprietorship.
